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Abstract— This paper presents an approach of a safe control 
synthesis of Timed Discrete Event Systems, based on timed 
properties. This synthesis aims to realize a fault-tolerant control 
during the detection of sensor faults. To establish this synthesis, 
the proposed approach relies on the modularity of the 
manufacturing systems to avoid the combinatorial explosion 
recurrent to several approaches. An example of a manufacturing 
system illustrates our remarks. 
Keywords— Timed discrete event systems, supervision theory, 
fault tolerant control, distributed control, manufacturing systems, 
modeling. 
I.  Introduction  
A Discrete Event System (DES) is defined as a dynamic 
system that can be described in a discrete state space and whose 
evolution is described by state transitions triggered by events 
[1]. One of the recurring problems with these systems is the 
establishment of an adequate control law that guarantees the 
safety of equipment and personnel while performing the tasks 
required. In [2], Ramadge and Wonham (R&W) initiated the 
Supervisory Control Theory (SCT) of DES (fig.1).  
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Fig. 1. Supervisory Control Theory principle 
This approach consists of determining a controller (called 
supervisor) which has the effect of restricting all possible states 
of the system to a subset of permissible states. R&W use finite 
state machines (FSM) and languages to model these systems. 
Although this approach is very formal, it shows a major 
disadvantage of its use on complex systems: the combinatorial 
explosion. In [3], [4], [5], [6] and [7], some approaches for 
control synthesis of DES have been proposed to overcome this 
problem. Although these approaches may have reduced the 
combinatorial explosion problem, they nevertheless remain 
dependent on Boolean information. But it is not the only 
information present when we consider time. This is called 
Timed Discrete Event Systems (TDES). 
Several approaches of literature [8], [9], [10] and [11] use 
timed automata, Petri nets, or finite state machines as a TDES 
modeling tools. In these works, time is modeled in two ways: 
• The discrete time, for which the progression of time is 
discrete and measured by a digital clock which is 
incremented by one unit at a time. 
• The dense time, for which the progression of time is 
continuous and measured by clocks taking positive real 
values. 
However, taking into account the passage of time makes the 
modeling step as well as the synthesis of the control by 
supervision more complex. To overcome these difficulties, we 
propose an extension of control synthesis approach proposed in 
[5] by exploiting its distributed design and introducing the time 
factor in the first stages of modeling. 
The purpose of this proposal is to construct a control 
structure that can be used as a fault-tolerant control. Indeed, 
many industrial applications require fault tolerance and 
continuity of service. Therefore, some strategies are defined 
from the earliest stages of the control design to facilitate the 
detection of faults, their location and the control 
reconfiguration. Several approaches have been proposed to 
overcome this problem. In [12], the authors have defined a 
switch control formalism that revises the controller parameters 
when a change of an embedded sensor network occur or when 
it’s repaired. The DES and its specification controller are 
modeled by a finite state machine. A mega-controller changes 
in the observation chains and selects the appropriate logic 
controller when changes occur. In [13] a reconfiguration 
approach based on supervisory control theory (SCT) was 
developed, the authors proposed a procedure based on SCT to 
reconfigure the controller without reconstructing its complete 
design. The reconfiguration keeps the behavior that does not 
change, eliminates the one that becomes useless after a faulty 
evolution, and adds the new updated behavior. Subsequently, 
the SCT ensures that the specifications are respected if a control 
synthesis is applied. Therefore, a partial reconfiguration using 
the SCT continues to adhere to the specifications that have not 
changed and ensures that the updated ones are also complied 
with in the new control law. In [14] a generic plant model of a 
DES that generates two behaviors is formulated: a nominal one 
and a failing one under a set of functional specifications and 
security constraints. The approach proposed an active fault-
tolerant control architecture such that the supervisor actively 
responds to faults as follows: (i) Design a nominal supervisor 
imposing faultless specifications, (ii) Design a diagnoser that 
unambiguously detects faults, and finally (iii) plant automatic 
switching to the second supervisor after a fault detection such 
that the system continues to operate safely. 
However, the use of these different methods is not easy. 
Indeed, the construction of fault-tolerant supervisors is a 
difficult task when the models to be treated are presented under 
a large size. This disadvantage is generally due to the fact that 
most of the approaches proposed in the literature for fault-
tolerant control have been developed for systems where the 
information used is decentralized, centralized or hierarchical. 
However, the majority of manufacturing systems, are 
informally distributed. 
Therefore, our contribution will be a fault-tolerant control 
method (fig.2). based on this axis of distributivity. When a 
sensor fault appears thanks to the diagnostic module, the 
information lost on a sensor will be replaced by a timed 
information through a coordinator that allows the switch 
between the distributed controller (GDCi) interpreted by a 
grafcet modelling (IEC 60848) of the normal behavior mode 
and the reconfigured one (GTDCi) in order to guarantee the 
continuation of the plant tasks in spite of the faults which may 
hinder its normal functioning. The diagnoser and coordinator 
determination is not the aim of this work, so we opt for the 
approach evoked in [15] to diagnose our system, and a method 
for determining the coordinator will be proposed in future 
works. 
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Fig. 2. A fault-tolerant control loop 
The proposed approach consists of the following steps (Fig. 
3): 
1. Modular and timed plant modeling: the resulting 
automaton is a timed plant element G(TPE). 
2. Definition of local functional and safety constraints in 
order to synthesis a local controller: the resulting 
automaton is a timed local controller G(TLC).  
3. Taking into account overall behavior constraints to 
determine timed distributed controllers: the resulting 
automaton is a G(TDC). 
4. Interpretation of timed distributed controllers into 
grafcet specification and their implementation in a 
programmable logic controller (PLC) through a standard 
language (IEC 61131-3). 
The paper is organized as following: Each step of the 
proposed approach is described in Section 2. Section 3 
illustrates our results around a transfer system benchmark. 
Conclusions and discussion close the paper in section 4. 
II. Basic Concept of Distributed 
Approach of TDESs 
A. Synthesis of timed local supervisory control 
Based on works evoked in [5] and [16], we propose an 
extended approach to synthesis timed local controllers TLC, 
with a method allowing their obtaining using Supremica 
software by the following steps: 
• Define the timed plant element (TPE) automaton G(TPE). 
• Define an extended model of G(TPE). 
• Define the set of local specifications. 
• Synthesize the timed local controllers G(TLC). 
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Fig. 3. The proposed distributed supervisory control architecture 
The timed plant modeling is an extension of the practical 
model [17] that describe the most respectful behavior of a 
component by introducing time.  
A Plant Element (PE) is obtained by a synchronous 
composition of detector, pre-actuators and actuators models. 
Each PE does not always have a set of detectors sufficient to be 
described. Therefore, a timed detectors models are introduced. 
It is then necessary to determine a timed actuators models.  
Formally, if the timed detectors model is modeled by an 
automaton G(TD) and the timed actuators model is defined by an 
automaton G(TA), The TPE automaton’ model is obtained by a 
synchronous composition of these two models: 
G(TPE) = (S, Σ, T, D, δ, s0, Sm) = G(TD) G(TA) 
With: 
• S= Finite set of states 
• Σ= Finite set of events such as: Σ = Σc  Σuc. With: 
Σc= Z  T  D and Σuc=E 
Z: Set of activations and deactivations of control orders 
zi (actuators outputs). 
E: Set of rising and falling edges of inputs variables ei 
(sensors inputs). 
T: Set of activations and deactivations of clocks Ti. 
With: ΣnT =Z  E set of not-timed events, and ΣT 
=T  D set of timed events. 
• T: Set of clocks, such as T= ti   ti. 
• D: Finite set of durations di associated to each clock ti, such 
as D= {d1, d2, …, di}. 
• δ: Transition function. A transition is defined by: δ(s1,σ)=s2 
such that s1 is the initial state and s2 is the final state. σ is the 
occurrence of a timed event or not of Σ. 
• s0: Initial state 
• Sm: Set of marked states 
Once G(TPE) is obtained, its extended automata is 
determined through an Extended Finite State Machines EFSM 
generated by supremica [16]. Differently to finite state 
machines (FSM), EFSM uses variables, guards and actions that 
can help the operator to compactly represent a large and 
complicated DES. Guard expressions are used to restrict the 
behavior of the system and action functions are used to update 
variables. The resulting extended automata of G(TPE) generated 
by supremica is noted G(TPE)_curr. 
A TLC is obtained using models of the TPE and its 
associated set of specifications, such that it is minimally 
restrictive with respect to the plant behavior, while still 
guaranteeing that the specifications are upheld. 
These specifications are defined by a logical implication in 
the form of:  
x⇒ ?̅?    (1) 
With 𝑥 ∈  𝑆𝑖 and  𝑦 ∈ Σ𝑐   . 
The implication (1) means that if x is true then y is 
forbidden, which is proved that can be also interpreted in the 
following form [18]: 
𝑥 ∙ 𝑦 = 0   (2) 
In this paper we choose equation (2) to interpret the set of 
specifications related to each TPE, and for an implementation 
purpose, the set of specifications is defined as an (EFSM) as 
shown in fig.4.  
s0
y
G(TPE)_curr !=  x  
Fig. 4. EFSM specification example 
The EFSM specification is composed of a single state and a 
self-loop transition. A guard “G(TPE)_curr != x” ( the courant 
state is different to x) is associated to the transition labeled with 
event y, the transition is enabled if and only if the guard formula 
is true. And by applying the synthesis of supervisory control on 
supremica of the two automata presenting G(TPE) and 
specifications. we obtain a G(TLC). 
B. Synthesis of timed global supervisory control 
To pass from a TLC to a timed distributed controller (TDC), 
it is necessary to go through two steps: the first one is the 
aggregation of the controllable events in macro-states and the 
second one is the integration of the functional and security 
constraints of the overall behavior. An extract of a TLC 
automaton is shown in fig.5.  
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Fig. 5. Extract from a timed local controller automaton G(TLC) 
The aggregation of a TLC is carried out in two steps: 
Step 1: Associate the states reached by the controllable events 
(zi ∈ {Σc ∩ ΣnT}) in macro-states linked by uncontrollable 
events (ei ∈ Σuc), and timed events: (ti ∈ ΣT) ∪ (di ∈ ΣT). If 
the TLC’ state is associated to a rising edge of a controllable 
event, then the order is authorized and belongs to the set Ord. If 
it’s associated to a falling edge of this event then the order is 
inhibited and belongs to the set Inh. 
Step2: Aggregate timed events ti in macro-states linked by 
uncontrollable events (ei ∈ Σuc) and timed events di. If the state 
of the timed local aggregated controller by the first aggregation 
is reached by an event corresponding to the clock' activation, 
then this event belongs to a set noted Aclock. If it is reached by 
an event corresponding to the clock' deactivation, then this 
event belongs to a set noted Dclock. The self-loop transition will 
be the transition that links the two macro-states that contain the 
two sets (Aclock and Dclock). The resulting automaton is the timed 
local aggregated controller called TLAC. An extract of TLAC 
automaton is shown in fig.6. 
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Fig. 6 Extract from a timed local aggregated controller automaton G(TLAC) 
The TLCs behave locally while respecting local security 
constraints. In order for these controllers to communicate and 
synchronize with each other, a set of global functional and 
security constraints must be determined in order to obtain timed 
distributed controllers TDC able of behaving in both local and 
global contexts, while ensuring the security of each plant 
element. A global constraint is modelled as follows: 
If a then {
𝑏 = 1
𝑏 = 0
 
If “b” is allowed and belongs to the set Ord, then (b=1) if 
and only if the condition “a” is true. 
If “b” is inhibited and belongs to the set Inh, then (b=0) if 
and only if the condition “a” is true. 
A TDC automaton is formally defined by: G (TDC) = (S(TDC), 
Σ(TDC), D(TDC), δ(TDC), E(TDC), C(TDC), s0(TDC), Sm(TDC)), with: 
• S(TDC): Finite set of states. 
• Σ(TDC): Finite set of events such as Σ(TDC)= {Σuc(TDC) ∪ 
Σc(TDC)} = {ΣT(TDC)∪ ΣnT(TDC)} ≠ ∅. 
• D(TDC): Finite set of durations di associated to each clock ti. 
• δ(TDC): Transition function. A transition is defined by: 
δ(s1,σ)=s2 such that s1 is the initial state and s2 is the target 
state. σ is the occurrence of a timed event di or 
uncontrollable event ei. 
• E(TDC): Set associated to each state of S(TDC), 𝐸𝑇𝐷𝐶
𝑠𝑖 = {𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖 , 
𝐼𝑛ℎ𝑠𝑖 , 𝐴𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘
𝑠𝑖 , 𝐷𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘
𝑠𝑖 }. 
• C(TDC): Finite set of constraints allowing authorization or 
inhibition of an order zi. 
The example of Fig.7 illustrates a TDC automaton. Each 
rectangle represents a state with its associated actions 
(authorised and inhibited orders), clocks (activated and 
deactivated clocks), and conditions, if any.  
s0 s1
s2
↑e0
↓e0
d0
(Ord: z0) If: a1.a2+a3
Inh: z0
Dclock:t0
Aclock:t0
 
Fig. 7. Example of a timed distributed controller automaton G(TDC) 
The set of S(TDC) states is defined by {s0, s1, s2}, the initial 
state s0(TDC) is identified by an incoming arrow. 
Σ(TDC)={ΣT(TDC) ∪ ΣnT(TDC)} with ΣnT(TDC)= {e0, z0} is the 
set of non-timed events and ΣT(TDC)= {t0, d0} is the set of 
timed events. 𝐸𝑇𝐷𝐶
𝑠0 = {z0, ∅, ∅, ∅}, 𝐸𝑇𝐷𝐶
𝑠1 = {∅, ∅, t0,, ∅}, 𝐸𝑇𝐷𝐶
2 = 
{∅, z0 , ∅, t0, }. Empty actions, clocks and conditions are not 
represented. 
C.  Grafcet interpretation of the TDC 
For an implementing purpose of timed distributed 
controllers in a PLC, an approach is followed to translate them 
into grafcet language. 
The clock activation (Aclock: ti) is translated by a timed 
action ti, associated to the grafcet step Xi, and the duration di is 
transformed into transition receptivity after Xi. The clock 
deactivation is not introduced in the grafcet because once the 
duration elapses, it causes the passage to the next step Xi+1. An 
example of this interpretation is shown in Fig. 8 
s20
s21
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Dclock:t0
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Fig. 8. example of timed distributed controller interpretation 
III. Application to a 
manufacturing system 
To illustrate our contribution, we use 3D FACTORY I/O 
simulator (https://factoryio.com/). It’s a digital twin for learning 
automation technologies, designed to be easy to use, it allows 
to quickly build a virtual factory using a selection of common 
industrial parts. FACTORY I/O also includes many scenes 
inspired by typical industrial applications, ranging from 
beginner to advanced difficulty levels. Using this tool, we built 
a boxes transfer system (fig.9), which is composed of:. 
 
Fig. 9. The manufacturing systems 
• Two pushers (monostable single effect cylinders): The first 
one (P1) pushes boxes in front of the second one (P2) which 
transfers them to the evacuation conveyor. 
• Two conveyor belts, to transport boxes in front the pusher 
P1, and to evacuate them to the stock.  
• Six sensors: {e0, e1} sensors for the presence of a box in 
front of the pushers, {e2, e4} sensors associated to the 
pushers input, and {e3, e5} sensors associated to the pushers 
output. 
• A start’ push button PbStart. 
In this example we assume that the sensor e3 don't work 
anymore and must be replaced by a timed information. the 
element that allows us to ensure this information is the clock t1. 
In the following figure (fig.10) we present the two models of 
the system with and without sensor e3. We then show that the 
information lost on e3 due to a fault is replaced by a clock. the 
flow of the predetermined duration means that the pusher has 
reached its final output position. 
In order to obtain a timed local controller that describes the 
desired local behavior, some functional specifications must be 
determined: 
• First specification: The deactivation of P is due to the 
clock deactivation, so P must be forbidden to appear in 
state s1 and s3. This specification is defined by the 
following equation (3). 
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Fig. 10. Timed plant element automaton corresponding to the pusher 1 G(TPE)P1 
(𝑠1 + 𝑠3) ∙ ↓ 𝑃1 = 0   ⇔     {
𝑠1 ∙ ↓ 𝑃1 = 0
𝑠3 ∙ ↓ 𝑃1 = 0
   (3) 
The automaton that translates this specification is shown 
in fig.11. 
s0
↓P1
G(TPE)P1_curr !=  s1 & G(TPE)P1_curr !=  s3  
Fig. 11. Specification 1 automaton 
 The figure above shows that if the current state of 
G(TPE)P1 is different from s1 and s3, then P1 is allowed to 
appear. 
• Second specification: The deactivation of t1 is due to the 
sensor e1 deactivation, so t1 must be forbidden to appear 
in state s5. This specification is defined by the following 
equation. 
𝑠5 ∙ ↓ 𝑡1 = 0     (4) 
The automaton that translates this specification is shown 
in fig.12. 
s0
↓t1
G(TPE)P1_curr !=  s5  
Fig. 12. Specification 2 automaton 
Applying these two specifications, the two transitions 
associated to ↓P1 and outgoing from s1 and s3, and the transition 
associated to ↓t1 and outgoing from s5 are deleted. 
Consequently, the state s4 becomes inaccessible and will be also 
deleted. The timed local controller describing the desired 
behavior obtained is shown in figure 13. 
↓t1 ↑t1
d1
s0 s1
s2s5
s3
↑P1
↓e1
↓P1
↑e1
 
Fig. 13. The timed local controller automaton of pusher 1, G(TLC)P1 
Applying the untimed and timed aggregation explained in 
previous sections, we obtain the following automaton: 
s0 s1
s2
↓e1
↑e1
Ord: P1
Inh: P1
Dclock: t1
d1
Aclock: t1
 
Fig. 14. Timed local aggregated controller of pusher 1 G(TLAC)P1 
In the initial state s0, P1 is authorized and belongs to the set 
Ord of the authorized events, the deactivation of e1 causes the 
activation of the clock t1, this activation is aggregated in a 
macro-state s1 and belongs to the set Aclock of clocks activation. 
After the flow of the duration d1 associated to the clock t1, t1 
will be deactivated and will cause the deactivation of P1. 
Therefore, in the state s2, t1 will belong to the set Dclock (set of 
clocks deactivation) and P1 will belong to the set Inh (Set of 
inhibited orders). 
To be able to obtain the distributed controller corresponding 
to the pusher P1, the overall functional and security constraints 
must be taken into account. The pusher must push out if a piece 
is present (e0 = 1), but to guarantee the safety, it must be verified 
that the pusher 2 is in the retracted position which is ensured by 
(e4 = 1). Therefore, these constraints will be translated by the 
following equation: 
If (e0 ∙ e4) then P1=1    (5) 
Taking into account this specification, we obtain the 
following timed distributed controller automaton G(TDC)P1. 
s0 s1
s2
↓e1
↑e1
(Ord: P1) If e0 . e4
Inh: P1
Dclock: t1
d1
Aclock: t1
 
Fig. 15. Timed distributed controller of pusher 1 
 If the overall behavior specifications are verified, the 
output of pusher P1 is allowed, which causes the deactivation of 
sensor e1 associated to P1 input. Once e1 is deactivated, the clock 
is activated until the passage of the duration d1 which leads to 
t1 and P1 deactivation. Therefore, P1 returns to its initial state 
and e1 will be reactivate. 
The grafcet equivalent of this TDC automaton is shown in fig 
16. 
X21
X22
P1=1
d1 /X22
X20
X23
↓e1
↑e1
e0 . e4
P1=0
T1
 
Fig. 16.Grafcet interpretation of G(TDC)P1 
IV. Conclusion and prospects 
In this work we have proposed a new approach of 
integrating time in order to synthesis a timed distributed control 
for discrete event systems DES. This control synthesis aims at 
achieving a fault-tolerant control during the detection of a 
sensor fault through the diagnoser. A decision block decides 
whether the fault is tolerable or not. If it is tolerable, a 
reconfiguration where the information lost on the sensor is 
replaced by a timed information is necessary. Our timed 
distributed control is based first on a timed modelling of each 
plant element, the second step is determining the different timed 
local controllers by taking account the local functional and 
security constraints. In order to define timed distributed 
controllers, the overall functional and security constraints 
should be verified. The resulting controllers are interpreted into 
grafcet language for an implementation purpose. In our short-
term works, a formal method to determine the coordinator that 
allows the switching between the normal behavior controller to 
its equivalent reconfigured behavior controller will be 
proposed.  
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